Supply Chains Don’t Have a Trust Problem – It's the Incentives. Realigning Incentives Solves Pricing, Opacity, and Payment Delays.

Written By
Derek Szopa

In 1995, Charlie Munger stood at a podium at Harvard University to explain why smart people and sophisticated organizations routinely make terrible decisions. At the very top of his list was the power of incentives—or as he famously summarized it: "Show me the incentive and I will show you the outcome." This principle is illuminated–and expensive for many–within modern freight logistics and middle-mile supply chain management.  

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To prove his point, Munger didn’t tell a Wall Street story.  He told what he called one of his favorite business cases of all time: the Federal Express night sort.

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As Munger told it, the entire integrity of the FedEx network depended on planes converging on a central hub each night, unloading, sorting packages across the dock, and reloading outbound flights before sunrise.  Early on, FedEx had "one hell of a time" getting the night shift to finish on time. Management tried "moral suasion" and everything else without luck—until someone realized that paying night-shift handlers strictly by the hour penalized them for working fast.

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Having worked at FedEx, I’ve always appreciated Munger’s story—even if the outsider version slightly simplifies how hub pay actually works.

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Part-time night package handlers weren't dragging out the sort to rack up 40-hour overtime; they were stretching a 3-hour sort into 4 or 5 hours because if they hustled and loaded the planes in 2.5 hours, they went home with a paycheck that (felt like) barely covered their commute in the middle of the night. When you institute a guaranteed minimum shift payout—so crews earn their full night's minimum even when they clear the sort early and head home—you remove the financial penalty for speed.

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Whether you look at Munger’s parable or the reality on the sortation floor, the takeaway is identical: the workers weren't lazy or unmotivated.  They were simply responding rationally to how the clock paid them.

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Commonly Misaligned Incentives that Encumber Middle-Mile Logistics 

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Twenty years before Munger’s speech, organizational theorist Steven Kerr gave this exact phenomenon a name in his 1975 management classic, "On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B." Kerr observed that across business and government, leaders constantly profess that they want Behavior B (transparency, long-term reliability, teamwork), while designing systems that financially reward Behavior A (opacity, short-term opportunism, hiding mistakes).

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If you look at how domestic middle-mile transit and warehousing operate today, our industry is trapped in that exact folly.  We spend billions on visibility software, vendor scorecards, and relationship management—hoping for trust and reliability—while operating inside a market structure that rewards the exact opposite.

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Consider four places where supply chain incentives are fundamentally upside-down:

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1. We hope for transparency, but reward opacity. Shippers want to know exactly which carrier holds their freight, and asset-based operators want fair compensation for the work they perform. Yet when a transaction is mediated by an opaque rate spread—where an intermediary's profit is defined by the hidden gap between what the shipper pays and what the carrier receives—the market explicitly rewards information asymmetry.

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2. We hope for commitment, but reward defection.  Every year, shippers and carriers spend months negotiating annual RFPs and capacity forecasts. Yet those agreements rarely hold when the market turns. Why? Because when spot rates plunge, shippers are incentivized to abandon "paper" volume commitments to chase cheaper freight.  And when capacity tightens, carriers remember those broken promises and divert their trucks to the highest spot bidder.  Neither side is acting in bad faith; both are acting in self-defense inside a contract model with zero bilateral teeth.

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3. We hope for fast execution, but stretch out settlement.  Corporate finance teams are incentivized to protect working capital by stretching payment terms to 60 or 90 days—or holding entire invoices hostage over minor paperwork discrepancies.  In response, asset-based carriers and warehouse operators—who have to pay for fuel, driver wages, and facility leases today—are forced to factor their receivables at steep discounts or bake a "slow-pay risk premium" directly into their rates.

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4. We hope for honest pricing, but reward the "Accessorial Ambush."  At booking, shippers are incentivized to estimate pallet weights generously or gloss over handling nuances to secure a low base rate.  On the flip side, operators who get burned by heavier-than-expected freight or dock delays are incentivized to claw back their margin through surprise post-delivery accessorial charges and re-classification fees.  Invoices turn into a post-execution negotiation.

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Fixing Supply Chain Incentives at the Transaction Level 

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When planes leave late, when freight gets double-brokered, or when invoices turn into 60-day battlegrounds, the temptation is to blame the counterparties.  We tell ourselves we need stricter carrier vetting, tougher procurement negotiations, or another layer of tracking software.

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The lesson from the floor is that moral appeals and stricter policing never fix a structural flaw.  If you want a different outcome in logistics, you have to re-engineer the incentives at the transaction level:

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  • Take the venue out of the rate spread.  When the technology connecting buyers and sellers charges a flat, transparent software fee rather than trading on the hidden margin between them, the incentive to mask carrier identities or distort market prices disappears.
  • Balance the settlement clock.  A healthy market shouldn't force shippers to lock up working capital months in advance, nor should it force carriers to act as a bank for 60 days. When a shipper can book capacity ahead with zero upfront capital lockup, and the carrier or warehouse is guaranteed an automatic, programmatic payout 48 hours after a verified, intact delivery, both sides win.
  • Price the physical reality upfront.  Instead of fighting over freight classes and surprise surcharges after the fact, physical boundaries, weight tiers, and specialized handling requirements should be standardized and priced before the load ever moves—with clear, automatic remedies if a party cancels at the eleventh hour or shows up with non-conforming cargo.

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Good actors in the supply chain shouldn't have to be policed into doing the right thing. When you align the rules of the transaction so that transparency, accuracy, and on-time performance are the most profitable path for everyone at the dock, the market takes care of the rest.

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Key Takeaways

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Why do mid-term freight RFPs fail when the market shifts? Multi-year RFPs typically rely on non-binding "paper" volume commitments. When spot rates drop, shippers are motivated to shift volume to cheaper carriers; when capacity tightens, carriers are motivated to prioritize higher-paying spot freight. Without bilateral accountability, both parties are incentivized to defect. 

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How do 60-to-90-day payment terms affect freight rates? Extended payment terms force asset-based carriers and warehouses to cover immediate costs—like fuel, payroll, and leases—out of pocket. To survive the cash flow gap, operators build a "slow-pay risk premium" directly into their base rates, driving up overall shipping costs. 

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How can shippers and carriers eliminate surprise accessorial fees? Rather than estimating weights or handling needs at booking and disputing invoices post-delivery, both parties should standardize physical boundaries, weight tiers, and handling requirements upfront with pre-agreed remedies for non-conforming freight or late cancellations.

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‍Think about where you see the biggest "misaligned incentive" in logistics today—is it in how capacity is priced, how freight is brokered, or how invoices are settled? 

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